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The patenting of genetic material raises a host of concerns such as moral
and ethical issues, the weakening of the utility requirement and the blockage
of downstream research. This article examines the patentability of genetic
material in the United States, Canada and the European Union. It discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of the current patent system in relation to
patents on genetic material. The article concludes with suggestions regarding
the protection of intellectual property rights in light of growing concerns.
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INTRODUCTION

The biotechnology industry is still in its infancy, with many breakthroughs
on the horizon. However, even in its early stages, we have witnessed
many improvements in technology such as cloning and the mapping of
the human genome under the Human Genome Project. The boom in
the biotechnology industry is considered by many to have been ignited
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Diamond v.
1
Chakrabarty. This growth within the biotechnology industry, especially
in regards to patenting genetic material, has caused many people to
criticize the current patent system. The system is being strained by recent
developments in technology that were never initially contemplated.
Ikechi Mgbeoji and Byron Allen have stated that “the patent system was
not originally designed for protection of life forms. Rather, early patent
systems… were dominated almost exclusively by machines and mechanical
2
devices.” They also mention that “as early industrialization evolved
from machines and extended to chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and lately,
biotechnology, the patent regime expanded its scope of patentable subject3
matter to accommodate the claims of those emergent industries.”
The intent of this paper is to examine the patentability of genetic material
in the United States, Canada and the European Union and to discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of the current patent system in relation to
biotechnology. In the first section of this paper, relevant terminology will
be defined and discussed to provide a technical background. Section II will
examine the patentability of genetic material in the United States, Canada
and the European Union through relevant jurisprudence and legislation.
Concerns regarding patents on genetic materials will be examined in
the third section. These concerns include moral and ethical issues, the
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) [Chakrabarty].
2 Ikechi Mgbeoji & Byron Allen, “Patent First, Litigate Later! The Scramble for
Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents: Implications for Access to Health Care and
Biomedical Research” (2003) 2 C.J.L.T. 83 at 85.
3 Ibid. at 85.
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weakening of the utility requirement for patentability and the blocking
of downstream research and development. The fourth section will cover
arguments in support of granting patents on genetic material, focusing
on the need for patent protection to increase research and development.
The fifth section will examine possible solutions to issues proposed in
section III, in order to reconcile those concerns with the protection of
biotechnology products and processes.
In addition to these concerns, there are other highly contentious issues
surrounding biotechnological patents, such as the appropriation of
indigenous knowledge and the genetic use restriction of agricultural
products. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and so will not be
covered in this analysis. Detailed discussions of these issues may be found
in academic commentary elsewhere.4

I. BACKGROUND

Before engaging in a discussion dealing with highly technical terms, it is
important to initially define the relevant terminology. For the purpose
of this paper, genetic material includes “a gene, part of a gene, a group of
genes, or fragment of many genes, a molecule of DNA, a fragment of DNA,
a group of DNA molecules, or fragments of DNA molecules” and “[c]ould
refer to anything from a small fragment of DNA to the entire genome of
5
an organism.” A biotechnological innovation/invention will include the
4 For a detailed discussion on the appropriation of indigenous knowledge, see: Ikechi
Mgbeoji, “Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent
Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio-Piracy?” (2001) 9 Ind. J. Global Legal
Stud. 163. For a detailed discussion on the genetic use restriction of agricultural products,
see: Chidi Oguamanam, “Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies (GURTs)
in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Limits of Technological Alternatives to Intellectual
Property” (2005) 4:1 C.J.L.T. 59.
5 Biology Online, Genetic Material, online: Biology Online < http://www.biology-online.
org/dictionary/Genetic_material>.
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production or processing of the genetic material outlined in the definition
6
of genetic material. Such innovations may take many forms, whether
it be the development of a genetic test for diseases or the isolation and
purification of genetic material. As will be discussed throughout this paper,
patents on genetic sequences are quite controversial. A genetic sequence
(also referred to as a DNA sequence) is “the precise ordering of the bases
7
(A, T, G, C) from which DNA is composed.” The following is an example
of a genetic sequence:
AATGCTGATTTTGATGGA
The function of a genetic sequence is often unknown to scientists at the
time of patent application.8 This will be examined in section III under the
lack of utility requirement.
Other forms of genetic material that will be covered throughout this
paper include expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs). Patents have been granted on these materials in
9
the United States, Canada and the European Union. ESTs are defined
as “a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify
10
unknown genes and to map their positions within a genome.” They
have aided scientists to discover and isolate genes that are involved with
many diseases, including colon cancer and Alzheimer’s disease.11 It is
thus obvious that ESTs are important to assist with the research and
development of innovative medicines and treatments. SNPs are also
important in the identification of genetic diseases. They involve a variation
6 Mona Frendo, “Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Innovations” (January
2001) online: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee < http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
epic/site/cbac-cccb.nsf/en/ah00417e.html>.
7 Webster’s New World Medical Dictionary, 2d ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003) s.v. “DNA
sequence”.
8 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 86.
9 Ibid.
10 A Science Primer, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI
Resources, ESTs: Gene Discovery Made Easier, online: National Center for Biotechnology
Information
< http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html>.
11 Ibid.
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within a gene that can be linked to the development of certain diseases.
Researchers believe that a genetic predisposition to a disease is not caused
by one single nucleotide variation; however, SNPs over stretches of DNA
12
may allow them to associate an SNP with a particular disease trait. It
is also believed that SNPs are “useful in helping researchers determine
and understand why individuals differ in their ability to absorb drugs….
Therefore, the recent discovery of SNPs promises to revolutionize not only
the process of disease detection but also the practice of preventive and
13
curative medicine.” Other technical terms are included throughout this
paper and are defined in their relevant sections.

II. PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC MATERIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION

A. Patentability of Genetic Material in the United States
In the United States, patentable subject matter is covered under the
14
U.S. Patent Act, Title 35, § 101. This section states that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
15
of this title.” This is, of course, subject to the requirements of novelty,
non-obviousness and utility. These three requirements are not unique to
the United States; they are a common feature of patent laws throughout
the world. This section will focus on the development of U.S. patent law
in relation to the patentability of genetic material through examining
12 A Science Primer, Just the Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI
Resources, SNPs: Variations on a Theme, online: National Center for Biotechnology
Information
< http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/snps.html>.
13 Ibid.
14 35 U.S.C. § 101.
15 Ibid.
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the groundbreaking Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, as well as patent
applications for the Harvard Oncomouse and an invention of a halfhuman, half-animal creature.
1. Anything Under the Sun Made by Man
The leading case in the United States regarding patentable subject matter is
Diamond v. Chakrabarty. Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, a genetic engineer
working for General Electric, developed a micro-organism that possessed
the ability to decompose crude oil. Mr. Chakrabarty applied for a patent
but was initially rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
on appeal. He then appealed to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. The Court allowed the appeal; however, the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In a 5-4 decision in 1980, the Court affirmed the previous decision
and held that “[a] live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter under § 101. [The] respondent’s micro-organism constitutes
16
a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within that statute.” In its
decision, the Court held that when codifying the U.S. patent laws in 1952,
congress intended patentable subject matter to include “anything under
17
the sun that is made by man.” The decision in Chakrabarty caused great
controversy throughout the biotechnology industry and academia. Many
people criticized the decision by arguing that it would not provide a barrier
to the patenting of “higher forms of life – such as plants, animals, and
18
possibly human beings.” The following two paragraphs will examine two
applications of the Chakrabarty standard: one where the USPTO granted a
patent on a mouse, and another where it denied a patent on human beings.
2. Mice, Man and Humanzee?
In 1988, the USPTO granted a patent to Harvard College for the Harvard
Oncomouse. An Oncomouse is a transgenic mouse that has been genetically
16 Chakrabarty, supra note 1.
17 Ibid.
18 Daniel J. Kelves & Ari Berkowitz, “The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of
Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics” (2002) 67 Brook. L. Rev. 233 at 234.
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modified to carry an oncogene (a gene that contributes to the development
19
of cancer) in order to further cancer research. Genetically manipulating
animals raises a host of ethical questions such as animal cruelty, as well as
raising the issue of whether the patent meets the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness and utility. In coming to its conclusion, it appears that the USPTE
did not consider ethical issues to be a relevant factor. Nonetheless, the USPTO
ruled that humans would be excluded from patentability because of “moral
and legal concerns about patents on human beings, and about modification
20
of the human genome.” The subsequent sections dealing with patentability
of genetic material in Canada and the European Union will demonstrate how
the Oncomouse patent application received more scrutiny in those respective
jurisdictions than it did in the United States.
In an attempt to spur the debate on morality of biotechnology, social
activist Jeremy Rifkin and scientist Stuart Newman subsequently applied
for patent protection for the invention of a half-human, half-animal
21
labelled the “Humanzee.” In 1998, the USPTO issued one of its many
rejections on the basis that the claim “embraced a human being”, therefore,
22
rendering its subject matter unpatentable. The USPTO issued the
following statement in one rejection of the invention:
The presence of some nonhuman primate cells does not
make a human embryo nonhuman… Contrary to the
argument that the claimed animal was never exclusively
human in origin, i.e., that the chimeric embryo never
existed as a human embryo, the specification states: “the
invention relates to chimeric embryos and chimeric
animals created from human embryos.”… The Office does
23
not agree that humans are patentable subject matter.
19 WIPO Magazine, “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse” WIPO
(June 2006), online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/
article_0006.html >.
20 Ibid.
21 Brock Heathcotte & Jason Scott Robert, “The Strange Case of the Humanzee Patent
Quest” (2006) National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 51 at 52.
22 Ibid. at 53.
23 Ibid. at 53.
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A chimera is an animal with genetic material from two or more species.
Combining genetic material from a human and an animal is clearly
an ethical concern. The decisions by the USPTO in both the Harvard
Oncomouse and Humanzee patent applications demonstrate that
patentable subject matter does not extend to human beings. Through an
examination of those patent applications, as well as the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Chakrabarty, it is evident that patentable subject matter under
U.S. patent law includes the fundamental building blocks of genetic
material, including gene sequences, ESTs, SNPs and higher life forms such
as plants and animals.

B. Patentable Subject Matter: The Canadian Debate
24

Canadian patent law is governed by the Patent Act. Section 2 of the Act
outlines patentable subject matter; it states that an “‘invention’ means any
new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine,
25
manufacture or composition of matter.” As in the U.S., in order to be
granted a patent in Canada, an invention must be novel and non-obvious,
and must have utility. The Canadian Patent Act is similar to U.S. patent law
under Title 35; however, Canada and the U.S. have different conceptions of
acceptable patentable subject matter. The difference in the patentability of
genetic material will be examined by exploring Canadian jurisprudence.
The two major cases that have outlined patentable subject matter in
26
Canada are Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) and
27
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser.

24 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
25 Ibid. at s. 2.
26 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45
[Harvard College].
27 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 [Monsanto].
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1. Higher Life Forms vs. Lower Life Forms
The Harvard College case resulted from the rejection of the patent
application for the Harvard Oncomouse by the Canadian Patent Office.
The decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal where the appeal
was allowed; however, that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court
28
of Canada (SCC). In a 5-4 decision, the SCC overturned the Federal
Court of Appeal’s decision and rejected the patent. The SCC held that the
transgenic mouse constituted a higher life form and that higher life forms
are not patentable subject matter under the s. 2 definition of inventions,
29
thereby departing from the U.S. position. Justice Bastarache, for the
majority, held that he:
[C]annot…agree with the suggestion that the definition
is unlimited in the sense that it includes “anything under
the sun that is made by man”. In drafting the Patent
Act, Parliament chose to adopt an exhaustive definition
that limits invention to any “art, process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter”. Parliament did
not define “invention” as “anything new and useful made
by man”. By choosing to define invention in this way,
Parliament signalled a clear intention to include certain
subject matter as patentable and to exclude other subject
matter as being outside the confines of the Act. This
should be kept in mind when determining whether the
words “manufacture” and “composition of matter” include
30
higher life forms.
The majority held that “the Court does not possess the institutional
competence to deal with issues of this complexity” and that it should be up
31
to Parliament to decide whether higher life forms may be patented.

28
29
30
31

WIPO, supra note 19.
Harvard College, supra note 26.
Ibid. at para. 158.
Ibid. at para. 183.
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The dissenting judges agreed with the majority that the decision to
include higher life forms under patentable subject matter should be left
to Parliament. However, they stated that “neither the Commissioner of
Patents nor the Court have the authority to declare, in effect, a moratorium
32
on [higher] life form patents until Parliament chooses to act.” The dissent
found no requirement in the Patent Act for examining public order and
morality, nor any provisions excluding the patentability of higher life
forms.
2. In Reverse, but not Reversal
The dissent in Harvard College paved the way for the SCC’s backtracking
in Monsanto. In this case, Monsanto Canada Inc. (Monsanto) sued farmer
Percy Schmeiser over his unlicensed used of Monsanto’s seed which was
marketed as Roundup Ready Canola. The seed contained a gene patented
by Monsanto that aids in controlling weeds because it prevents crops
from being damaged by certain herbicides. In Monsanto the SCC split
5-4 and found that Mr. Schmeiser infringed Monsanto’s patent under s.
42 of the Patent Act. The essence of the majority decision was that even
though a higher life form cannot be patented, the patent protection for the
genetic material that makes up the higher life form may extend to protect
the higher life form itself. The Court’s decision in Monsanto therefore
marked a departure from the Court’s line of reasoning in Harvard College.
However, it was not a reversal of its previous decision, at least in the eyes
of the Court. One of the reasons for the Court’s departure may have been
its change of personnel. Justices Gonthier and L’Heureux-Dubé of the
majority in Harvard College had retired from the Court, while Justices Fish
and Deschamps joined the Court and aligned with majority in Monsanto.
The current position on the patentability of genetic material is that higher
life forms still cannot be patented but the “fundamental building blocks
of the human body – DNA, RNA, proteins and genes – can be patented
in Canada if they meet the statutory criteria of novelty, utility and non33
obviousness.” In order to receive a patent on a genetic sequence, it must
32 Ibid. at para. 114.
33 Frendo, supra note 6.
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be isolated or purified from its natural source within the body and it must
34
meet the requirements for non-obviousness and utility. This position was
upheld in the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Harvard College and was
affirmed upon appeal to the SCC; it was also upheld in the SCC’s decision
in Monsanto.

C. Patenting of Genetic Material in the European Union:
A Moral Decision?
The patenting of genetic material in the European Union has been quite
controversial. As in Canada and the U.S., one of the most controversial
patent applications has been for the Harvard Oncomouse. As discussed
above, the patent had previously been granted in the United States
and would later be rejected in Canada. Harvard College filed a patent
application in 1985. The application was rejected by the European
Patent Office (EPO) in 1989 on numerous grounds, one of them being a
35
“European prohibition against the patenting of animals.” The Oncomouse
patent was not initially rejected for being contrary to “ordre public” or
morality under article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC).
Article 53(a) states that:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which
would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, provided
the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in
36
some or all of the Contracting States.
The decision by the Examining Division of the EPO was appealed to the
Board of Appeals, where the Board decided that the Examining Division
34 Ibid.
35 Baruch Brody, “Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: The European Debate” (2007)
17:2 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 69 at 91.
36 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, Article 53.
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37

erred in rejecting the Oncomouse patent. The Board of Appeal sent the
case back to the Examining Division in 1992 and provided it with a three
part test to examine the patentability issue in order to reconcile it with
Article 53 of the EPC. The test consisted of the balancing of risks and
detrimental effects associated with an invention against its benefits. The
three interests the Examining Division considered were: “(1) the interest in
remedying human disease, (2) the interest in protecting the environment
from the uncontrolled spread of unwanted genes, and (3) the interest in
38
avoiding cruelty to animals.” In 1992, the Examining Division granted the
patent on the transgenic mouse stating that:
In the overall balance the Examining Division concluded
that the present invention cannot be considered immoral
and contrary to public order. The provision of a type of
test animal useful in cancer research and giving rise to
a reduction in the amount of testing on animals… can
39
generally be regarded as being beneficial to mankind.
Over the next 12 years, the Examining Division’s decision was challenged on
numerous occasions. In July 2004, the EPO issued its final decision on the
Harvard Oncomouse patent by upholding the patent, but limiting it to mice.40
Throughout the time period that the Oncomouse patent was challenged, the
European Parliament and European Council worked on a biotechnology
directive to address the patentability of biotechnological inventions,
including genetic material. This directive will be examined in what follows.
1. European Biotechnology Directive, 98/44/EC
On July 6, 1998, the European Parliament and European Council issued
the European Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
37 Brody, supra note 35 at 91.
38 Margo A. Bagley, “Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law” (2003) 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469 at 520.
39 Jaenichen, H., The European Patent Office’s Case Law on the Patentability of
Biotechnology Inventions, (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1993), cited in Brody, supra note
44 at 94.
40 Brody, supra note 35 at 98.
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Inventions. The issuance of the Directive was met with criticism by many
of the EU member states. Within three months, the government of the
Netherlands challenged the Directive. It argued that the Directive should be
annulled because it was too vague regarding whether patents would be denied
based on ethical grounds. It also argued that the Directive allowed patents to
be granted on isolated genetic material, which it considered to be a violation
42
of human dignity. In 2001, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rejected
the Dutch government’s challenge, confirming the validity of the Directive
and stating that both Article 5 and Article 6 of the Directive addressed Dutch
43
concerns about human dignity and public morality. The Court acknowledged
that Article 5 appropriately addresses the concerns about human dignity by
44
excluding certain elements of the human body from patentability:
Article 5
1. The human body, at the various stages of its formation
and development, and the simple discovery of one of its
elements, including the sequences or partial sequence of a
gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.
2. An element isolated from the human body or otherwise
produced by means of a technical process, including the
sequence or partial sequences of a gene, may constitute a
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element
is identical to that of a natural element.
3. The industrial application of a sequence or partial
sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent
45
application.
Article 6 of the Directive was aimed at giving effect to ethical concerns
41 Council Directive (EC) 98/44 of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions [1998] OJ L213/13 [Directive].
42 Duncan Curley and Andrew Sharples, “Patenting Biotechnology in Europe: The Ethical
Debate Moves On” (2002) 12 Eur. I.P. Rev. 565 at 565-566.
43 Conference Report, “The Trials and Tribulations of the Biotech Patent Directive”
Academy of European Law (July 2006), online: Academy of European Law <http://www.
era.int/web/de/resources/5_1095_2867_file_en.3961.pdf>.
44 Ibid.
45 Directive, supra note 41 at Article 5.
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about the patenting of certain genetic material:
Article 6
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where
their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre
public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited
by law or regulation.
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular,
shall be considered unpatentable:
(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity
of human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to cause them suffering without any
substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also
animals resulting from such processes.46
Despite the ECJ ruling, the Directive remained controversial. By 2003,
47
only eleven European Union member states had adopted the Directive.
France initially refused to adopt the Directive because of concerns over
48
the patentability of genetic sequences without actual proof of their utility.
However, in 2004, both France and the Netherlands, two of the most vocal
of the opponents to the Directive, implemented the Directive into their
49
national patent law. Despite the reluctance by many of the nations over
concerns about morality and utility, all European Union members had
46 Ibid. at Article 6.
47 European Commission, “State of Play of the Implementation of Directive 98/44/EC”
(15 January 2007), online: European Commission < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
indprop/docs/invent/state-of-play_en.pdf>.
48 Matthias Herdegen, Patenting Human Genes and Other Parts of the Human Body under
EC Biotechnology Directive, online: Pharmalicensing.com
< http://pharmalicensing.com/public/articles/view/1008262393_3c18dcf915ce1>.
49 European Commission, supra note 47.
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50

adopted the Directive by 2007.

III. CONCERNS REGARDING THE PATENTING OF
GENETIC MATERIAL
Altering the genetic make-up of humans, animals and plants raises many
ethical issues. In an article published in the Ottawa Citizen in 1994,
“The Biology Business,” some of the general concerns that were raised
include the threat of “genetic accidents,” the use of animals in research
experimentation, genetic discrimination and the patenting of animal
51
species or genes. As mentioned previously, some of these concerns are
considered during the patent assessment process in the European Union.
On a deeper level, many more issues arise when addressing the question
of the patentability of genetic material. Some major concerns regarding
include the weakening of the utility requirement, the question of whether
such patents are contrary to morality, and the concern that granting
patents on genetic material will hinder biotechnological research rather
than advance it.

A. Weakening of the Utility Requirement
One major concern regarding the patentability of genetic materials is that
patents may be issued without fully satisfying the utility requirement.
There is a “growing concern among patent lawyers and policy-makers
that the major patent offices of the world are relatively lax and permissive
in issuing patents on biotechnological products without showing
52
demonstrable utility.” As mentioned previously, this was one of the many
50 Ibid.
51 “The Biology Business” The Ottawa Citizen (8 January 1994), cited in Hartley
Gorenstein, “The Regulation of Biotechnology in Canada: Social and Moral Issues” (1996)
2 Medical Law International 169, at 176-177.
52 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 83.
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complaints that EU member nations made about the Directive. If one were
to compare patents on mechanical and biotechnological inventions, it is
arguable that biotechnological patents are examined more favourably when
it comes to meeting the utility requirement. Mgbeoji and Allen suggest that
“[i]t is common knowledge that the patent offices would not issue patents
to mechanical inventions of dubious or uncertain utility. There is no reason
why a comparative attitude or stance should not be interpreted with respect
53
of genetic patents.”
Patents on genetic sequences as well as ESTs and SNPs have been granted
in the United States, Canada and other international jurisdictions. Many
of these patents have been granted without fully meeting the utility
requirement. Patent offices have granted patents based on the homology
54
of a sequence rather than a proven use. Homology refers to the similarity
55
between two distinct things based on their common origin. In relation to
genetic sequence patents, a patent would be issued on a genetic sequence
based on its being homologous to another sequence that has a specific use.
One reason why these patents may not meet the utility requirements is that
“a difference in a single base pair in a gene sequence can have important
56
functional implications.” There has been some effort to reiterate the
importance for a genetic material invention to have a specific utility before
receiving patent protection. Article 5(3) of the Directive addresses the issue
of genetic sequences by stating that the industrial application must be
disclosed in the patent application. However, many efforts like these have
failed in preventing the granting of patents that lack utility.

53 Ibid. at 90.
54 Ibid. at 86.
55 Dictionary.com, s.v. “homology”, online: Dictionary.com < http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/homology>.
56 David Dickson, “NIH Opposes Plans for Patenting ‘Similar’ Gene Sequences” (2002)
405 Nature 3, cited in Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 86.
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B. Contrary to Public Morality
This concern is perhaps the most widely published in relation to the
patentability of genetic material. Both proponents and opponents of
genetic biotechnology recognize that a host of ethical issues arise. Harley
Gorenstein suggested that “[t]he rapid advancement of biotechnology
raises profound questions about how society will deal with social,
moral, environmental and ethical issues arising from new and powerful
57
techniques to manipulate life.” Margo Bagley points out in her article,
“Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent
Law,” that there are no statutory morality requirements under U.S. patent
58
law and that the patent system is one of “patent first, ask questions later.”
She recommends that a new system should be adopted to deal with the
ethical concerns of genetic material patents. Despite the concerns that
have arisen over the past thirty years, patent offices around the world have
“continued to award patent rights over DNA sequences and other products
of biotechnology while [the] academic and social debate [continues to]
59
rage.”

C. Genetic Material Patents:
60
“A Tragedy of the Anticommons”
One of the greatest concerns associated with patenting genetic material,
especially the fundamental building blocks of the human genome
including DNA sequences and ESTs, is the possible concomitant restriction
on downstream research and development. These types of basic genetic
material can be viewed as the platform for biotechnological research. The
57 Harley Gorenstein, “The Regulation of Biotechnology in Canada: Social and Moral
Issues” (1996) 2 Medical Law International 169 at 169.
58 Bagley, supra note 38 at 494.
59 Richard E. Gold & Alain Gallochat, “The European Biotech Directive: Past As Prologue”
(2001) 7 Eur. L.J. 331, cited in Richard E. Gold, “From Theory to Practice: Health Care and
the Patent System” (2003) Health L.J. Special Edition 21 at 30.
60 The phrase “A Tragedy of the Anticommons” was established in an article by Michael
A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, then used by Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg in an article titled “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280:5363 Science 698.
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material once existed under a commons model, meaning many researchers
had relatively unrestricted access to it. However, the commons model
for biotechnological research that existed in the second half of the 20th
century has been pushed aside in favour of the current privatized system
61
of biotechnological research. This section will examine the anticommons
theory and how it relates to the patenting of genetic material.
In an article titled, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research,” Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg discuss a
theory put forward by Garret Hardin, which stated that a “tragedy of the
62
commons” occurs when there is an overuse of common resources. On
the contrary, the anticommons involves the underuse of a scarce resource
because too many people have been granted an exclusive right and have
63
the ability to prevent its use by others. The tragedy of the anticommons
has become a more pressing concern because of the shift from the
commons model to a privatized scheme marked by private investment
64
rather than governmental sponsorship. More funding is received by the
biotechnology firms because of the privatization of the industry. However,
“privatization can go astray when too many owners hold rights in previous
65
discoveries that constitute obstacles to future research.”
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the obstacle caused by
patenting genetic material is that downstream technology and improvements
may be prevented because exclusive patents are granted on platform
innovations. One example of the effects on downstream research is a
phenomenon known as a patent thicket, which involves “[a]n overlapping
set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology
66
[to] obtain licenses from multiple patentees.” The problem caused by patent
thickets is that it may be too costly to obtain licenses from each firm that
61 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 88.
62 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 60 at 698.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Cambridge Health Institute, “Biopharmaceutical Law & Intellectual Property Glossary
and Taxonomy” (22 October 2007), online: Cambridge Health Institute
< http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/intellectual_property.asp>.
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owns individual patents. Innovative products are delayed due to licensing
issues. Not only does the tragedy of the anticommons have an effect on
the commercialization of revolutionary medicines; it also has an effect
on applied research. Researchers may be less willing to conduct research in
67
areas that are covered by patents. Another issue that occurs is that many
laboratories are prevented from performing tests to discover genetic diseases
68
or the predisposition to those diseases because it is too costly. Solutions to
these problems are examined in section V.

IV. IMPORTANCE OF GENETIC MATERIAL PATENTS
Notwithstanding concerns over the patenting of genetic material, the
patent system was developed as a reward system to promote innovation.
Innovation in biotechnology has the potential to lead to groundbreaking
inventions that may contribute to improved health care and human
development. Schulman suggested that “[w]hile patenting DNA runs
the risk of diminishing respect for human dignity, some risk might be
69
acceptable if the end result were an increase in human well-being.” This
was the result that can be seen in the Harvard Oncomouse patent case
examined by the EPO. Ethical concerns may be overlooked if the benefit
to mankind outweighs the detrimental effects of a certain invention.
Additionally, it is believed that without the reward conferred by patent
protection of genetic material, investors would be reluctant to invest
in biotechnological and pharmaceutical firms for the development of
70
new technologies and drugs. This would have an unfavourable effect
on society. However, this does not mean that ethical and developmental
67 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 87.
68 Ibid.
69 Miriam Schulman, “Of SNPS, TRIPS and Human Dignity: Ethics and Gene Patenting”
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics online: Santa Clara University
< http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/schulman/genepatenting.html>.
70 Ibid.
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71

concerns should be ignored. Consideration must be given to where the
bar is set. “[I]f the bar is set too high… pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies will not put the vast sums necessary into research because
72
they will have no way to protect their investment.” On the other hand,
if the bar is set too low, society will run the risk of over patenting genetic
materials which will lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons.”

A. Biotechnology is Booming
In an article published by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Relaxin Case”, it was stated
that “[b]iotechnology is booming. Innovation in biotech is producing
new medicines, treatments and processes with the potential to save
73
or transform the lives of millions.” The biotechnology industry has
contributed to the development of over 200 new vaccines and products, as
well as 400 others that are in clinical trials, with the majority of those being
74
targeted at devastating diseases such as AIDS, cancer and heart disease. In
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2004 world health report, these
75
three diseases were listed in the top ten diseases throughout the world. It
is imperative that patents are granted to support the intellectual property
rights of the companies that produce these new medicines, treatments and
processes. The research and development of genetic material products and
processes is incredibly expensive. In 2006, approximately $29 billion was
76
spent on research and development within the industry. In receiving a
patent on genetic material, biotechnology firms are given exclusive rights
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 WIPO Magazine, “Bioethics and Patent Law: The Relaxin Case” WIPO (April 2006),
online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/02/article_0009.html >.
74 Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), Biotechnology Industry Facts, online:
Biotechnology Industry Organization < http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.
asp>.
75 WHO, The World Health Report 2004 (Geneva: WHO, 2004).
76 Battelle Technology Partnership Practice, Technology, Talent and capital: State
Bioscience Initiatives 2008, online: BIO at ES-3 < http://bio.org/local/battelle2008/State_
Bioscience_Initiatives_2008.pdf>.
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over the material and so become more attractive to private investors.
In 2006, the biotechnology industry received more than $24.8 billion
78
in private investments. Larger biotechnology firms are not the only
ones that require substantial amounts of funding to conduct pioneering
research. Start-up companies, with the potential to commercialize
similar biotechnology products, rely on venture capitalists to fund their
research and development. However, “[v]enture capitalists generally
require a potential for exceptionally high rates of return in exchange for
79
funding.” Patents on genetic materials are therefore required to secure
investment. Without patent protection, potentially life-saving medicines
and treatments would not be commercialized. Venture capitalists provide
approximately one third of the funding towards biotechnology firms. In
2007 alone, venture capitalists contributed a total of $11.6 billion towards
80
biotechnology firms, which was an increase of $600 million from 2000.

V. SUGGESTIONS FOR RECONCILING THE
PATENT SYSTEM WITH THE PATENTING
OF GENETIC MATERIAL

Since the biotechnology industry is still in its early stages, it is important
to consider some of the solutions that have been proposed to address the
problems identified above. Heller and Eisenberg suggest that “[p]olicy-makers
should seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to
minimize restrictive licensing practices that interfere with downstream
product development. Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead
81
paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health.”
77 Michael S. Mireles, “An Examination of Patents, Licensing Research Tools, and the
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation” (2004) 38 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
141 at 154.
78 BIO, supra note 74.
79 Mireles, supra note 77 at 163.
80 Battelle, supra note 76 at ES-3.
81 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 60 at 701.
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This section will discuss some of the potential suggestions to the current
problem faced by the industry, including patent pooling, stronger utility
requirements and the development of new research exemptions.

A. Patent Pooling and Cross-Licensing
One particular way in which patent thickets may be prevented is through
the development of a patent pooling system. This system would involve the
“pooling” of intellectual property rights possessed by each biotechnology
firm facilitated by a cross-licensing scheme which would provide a
greater opportunity for researchers to take advantage of their access to a
82
wide range of patented genetic materials. Patent pooling systems have
proven to be successful in many other technological areas including
83
the automobile, semi-conductor and the aircraft industries. Licensing
schemes have even been successful in a small sector of the biotechnology
industry, which is evident from licensing agreements that existed between
84
Stanford University, Cohen and Boyer and also other licensees. Even
though patent pooling is an attractive and viable option for the industry,
there are concerns over the outcome of these pools. One major concern
is that patent pooling will encourage anti-competitive behaviour between
85
firms, which could result in higher costs to consumers. In response
to this concern, the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines to be
followed before a patent pool will be approved: “[t]he pool applicants
are restricted from aggregating competing technologies for the purpose
of anticompetitive pricing…and the patent pool participants must not
86
attempt to affect market prices on downstream products.” Failing an
industry-wide patent pooling system, cross-licensing schemes may
be promoted between two separate biotechnology firms. The benefits
conferred on researchers would be limited to the firms involved with
the agreement; however, it is still a step in the right direction, that is, a
82 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93.
83 Graham Reynolds, Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a
Strict Utility Requirement [unpublished] at 61.
84 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 94.
85 Ibid. at 94.
86 Ibid. at 94.
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step away from the restriction placed on research and development by
anticommons and patent thickets.

B. Stronger Utility Requirements
As mentioned above, the current patent system is being chipped away at
because of the lax utility requirements for patents on genetic materials.
Patent offices throughout the world should enforce stronger utility
requirements before issuing patents on biotechnology inventions. Stringent
utility requirements benefit downstream research because they prevent
the abundant overlapping of claims over genetic sequences without those
87
claims’ having been proved useful. A more stringent utility requirement
will also ensure that society will receive the benefit of the patented
invention while the inventor retains the right to exclude others and to
88
recoup their investment. Since genetic sequences and ESTs have been
patented based on homologous grounds, patent applications for many
these genetic materials may be rejected if they are subjected to more
rigorous utility requirements.

C. Fair Use and Research Exemptions
Similarly to copyright law in Canada and the U.S., a fair use exemption
has been suggested to help researchers overcome the anticommons
89
problems that exist. Professor Maureen O’Rourke argued that fair use
may be used to “excuse infringement by researchers attempting to invent
around the patent even when the eventual end product is to be marketed
90
commercially.” As with copyright law, the fair use exemption is used as a
defence to infringement of copyright or it may be used as a user’s right. If
it is classified only as a defence, it would be a reactionary measure which
would put more of a strain on the court system and may cause researchers
87 Ibid. at 89.
88 Mireles, supra note 77 at 195.
89 Ibid. at 201.
90 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1177 (2000) at 1238.
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to second guess whether that excuse may apply to them. The major
difference between copyright law and patent law is that receiving copyright
protection is relatively costless, while the process for obtaining a patent
91
is costly. A fair use doctrine may not be the ideal alternative to alleviate
concerns regarding genetic material patents, but it does have the potential
to prevent the stifling of research and development.
Perhaps a more appropriate method would be for legislatures in all
jurisdictions to adopt a broader scope for the research exemption. In 2002,
the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) recommended
that the Canadian Patent Act be amended to include the following
provision:
It is not an infringement of a patent to use a patented
process or product either:
Privately and for non-commercial processes, or
To study the subject-matter of the patented
invention to investigate its properties ,improve
upon it, or create a new product or process.92
Adoption of the CBAC’s recommendations would provide researchers
93
with more leverage when using patented genetic material. At the same
time, adoption of these recommendations would grant researchers more
certainty when dealing with patented subject matter. This would contribute
to the advancement of more applied research and development beyond
the initial platform stage. However, there are objections to the research
exemption suggestion. It may result in a reduction of disclosures for
94
genetic material research tools such as ESTs and SNPs, which, in turn,
would be detrimental to the development of applied research. Therefore,
if legislatures attempt to amend research exemptions, they must be
cautious in their approach, in order to avoid contributing to the tragedy
of the anticommons. Although academics believe that a broader research
91 Mireles, supra note 77 at 204.
92 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee. Patenting Higher Life Forms and
Related Issues (Ottawa: CABC, 2002), cited in Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93.
93 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 93.
94 Mireles, supra note 77 at 216.
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exemption is better than a fair use exemption, patent pooling, which would
provide the biotechnology firms with more of an opportunity to recover
their investment through a licensing system, seems to be the preferable
95
route of reform.

CONCLUSION
It is evident that biotechnology patents on genetic material are essential
to help promote the research and development of groundbreaking
medicines, treatments and procedures. Many academics believe that
“[t]he field of biotechnology and biomedicine is at an early stage and
its immense promise should not be aborted by a lax interpretation and
96
application of contemporary laws.” The current patent system must
therefore be improved in order to prevent the blockage of future research
and development, while balancing the need to reward innovation and thus
encourage it.

95 Ibid. at 216.
96 Mgbeoji & Allen, supra note 2 at 95.

